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CIVIL LIBERTIES DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT,
1941 TERM
OSMOND

K. FRAENKEL t

The Term just ended, the first since President Roosevelt's
appointees have constituted more than a bare majority of the Court,
was remarkable, both for the extent of the division within the Court
and for the unusually large number of civil liberties cases considered.
There were more 5 to 4 decisions I than during any Term in which
the conservative and liberal blocs contended for mastery while Chief
Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts held the balance of power. 2 This
Term, however, no such consistent pattern characterized the Court as
during the former period-although Justices Black, Douglas and
Murphy voted generally together and became frequent dissenters.2
The division of the present Court showed itself clearly in the twentysix civil liberties cases. For it was unanimous in only fourteen-and
even in three of these there were differences in the reasons assigned.
The Court divided 5 to 4 in four cases; 4 4 to 4 in two cases; 5 and in
t A. B., 19o7, as of i9o8, A. M., i9o8, Harvard University; LL B., 19i1, Columbia
University; member of the New York Bar; author of THE SACCO-VANzErri CASE
(1931) ; editor, THE CuRsE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS

(i934); author, Constitutional Issues in the Supreme Court, T937 Term (1938) 87
U. oF P.A. L REv. so, and other articles in legal periodicals.
i. There were altogether i8 such cases (including one 4-3 case and one in which
the difference was in the grounds of decision) ; and there were 22 cases in which the
Court divided 6-3 or 5-3. There were also 2 cases in which the Court divided 4-4 and
one 3-3 case.
2. Thus at the crucial 1936 Term there were 13 cases in which the Court divided
5-4 or 4-3 and two in which it divided 4-4. At the x935 Term there had been eleven
5-4 cases.
3. These three justices dissented, either alone or with others in 13 cases; they
concurred specially in 4 others.
4. And, in addition, differed 5-4 in reasoning in the Ed-uards case. Edwards v.
California, 314 U. S. i6o (1941).
S. Since no opinions were written in these cases they have not been discussed
in the text. Weber v. United States, 62 Sup. Ct. 911 (1942), affirming, 1i9 F. (2d)
932 (C. C. A. 9th, i941), upheld the denial of citizenship to an applicant for relief.
(I)
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four cases three Justices dissented.' In the appendix at the end of this
article we list the division in each of the twenty-four cases in which
opinions were written.
It is difficult to find any really consistent grouping among the
Justices, however, or any consistent pattern in the decisions of any
particular judge. Not even Justices Black and Douglas, who agreed
with each other in all of these cases, were always on the civil liberties side, even when some of their confreres were. Nor did they
always agree with Justice Murphy. For, while these three judges differed from the majority, either in dissent or in special concurrence, in
seven cases, there were three in which Justice Murphy disagreed with
the other two. Justices Black and Douglas dissented together six times.
Justice Murphy agreed with them five times, and with the Chief Justice
and Justice Frankfurter twice. The two new Justices, Jackson and
Byrnes, showed all possible variations of agreement, dissent and special
concurrence in three cases carried over from the previous Term, 7 but
voted with the majority in all of the other cases in this field. Chief
Justice Stone.and Justice Frankfurter, except for the last case of the
Term, were always on the same side. Justices Roberts and Byrnes
agreed throughout and dissented only once. Justice Reed dissented
twice, each time in a 5 to 4 decision. And Justice Jackson never dissented at all-tbough he wrote two separate concurring opinions.
Thus it is impossible to trace any definite pattern among the judges
of this newly constituted Court, although it may be significant that
Justices Black and Douglas never agreed with Justices Roberts, Frankfurter or Byrnes, except when the Court was unanimous. Of the Court
as a whole it may be said that the decisions of this Term show a trend
away from that support of civil liberties which marked the period of
Hughes' Chief Justiceship. For the Court upheld the claim of infringed liberties in only eleven of the twenty-six cases, with dissents in
only two of the eleven cases. However, in the other fifteen cases in
which claims of civil liberties were rejected there were dissents in ten.
The subjects considered cover a wide range: peonage, jury questions, fair trial-. wiretapping, the right to counsel, leaflet distribution,
contempt of court, the right to travel from state to state, sterilization,
employers' rights of free speech and various aspects of picketing. We
Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 62 Sup. Ct. io3t (1942), affrmilng, 122 F.
(2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), refused to consider a plea that a complaint charging

as libelous a statement that a Congressman was anti-semitic violated the guaranty of
freedom of spcech. Justice Jackson participated in neither case.
6. And in Bakery and Pastry Drivers etc. v. Wohl, 62 Sup. Ct 816 (1942), Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy wrote a separate concurring opinion.
7. The Lisenba. Edzwrds and Bridges cases, cited notes 9, 49 and 59 infra. In the
Lisncab case the Court had, at the 194o Term. divided evenly. Lisenba v. California,
3t3 U. S. 537 (194x). But in other than civil liberties cases Justices Byrnes and
Jackson differed in numerous instances.
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shall discuss first the cases arising out of the conduct of criminal trials,
taking next various substantive rights and, last, the labor cases.
A.

RIGHTS OF THOSE ACCUSED OF CRIME

While no new principle was laid down by the Court in this field,
some of the decisions are nevertheless noteworthy for their explanations
of earlier cases. In several instances, although not without dissent, the
Court narrowed rights previously thought to exist in broad terms. In
one case, again not unanimously, it refused to reconsider an earlier
restrictive decision. Several cases dealt with confessions; two, with
the right to counsel; two with jury problems; one with the right to
appeal; two with wiretapping or related devices.
z. Confessions. In Lisenba v. California,' a case in which the
Court had evenly divided at the previous term, the majority refused to
reject a confession and only Justices Black and Douglas dissented. But
in Ward v. Texas 9 a different result was reached. In both cases
defendant was held by the police in violation of state laws requiring
immediate arraignment; in both he was questioned for prolonged
periods; in both evidence of alleged brutality was disregarded by the
Supreme Court, having been found incredible by the state courts. But
in the Lisenba case the majority affirmed, because they found the confession had been induced, not by the illegalities and the prolonged questioning, but by a confession made by a confederate. Mr. Justice Roberts
stressed the fact that Lisenba was advised by counsel and that he showed
self possession and acumen throughout. In the WYard case, on the other
hand, defendant, an ignorant Negro house-servant, was given no opportunity to consult with counsel or friends. Justice Byrnes said:
"This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions
extorted from ignorant persons who have been subjected to persistent and protracted questioning, or who have been threatened
with mob violence, or who have been. unlawfully held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel, or who have been taken
at night to lonely and isolated places for questioning. Any one of
these grounds would be sufficient cause for reversal. All of them
are to be found in this case." 10
And in Waley v. Johnston U1 the Court unanimously, in a per
curiam opinion, vacated the denial of a writ of habeas corpus and
ordered a hearing. Tn that case petitioner charged that agents of the
F. B. I. had, by coercion, induced him to plead guilty in a federal court
8. 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
9. 62 Sup. Ct. 1139 (1942).
io. Id at 1143.
11. 62 Sup. Ct. 964 (1942).
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to the crime of kidnapping. Although the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed 12 on the ground that petitioner, having been represented by
counsel, had waived the right to question the manner in which his plea
was obtained, the government confessed error. This, of course, is not
binding on the Supreme Court, which, in such cases always examines
the facts and law for itself. 13 Here the Court said:
"True, petitioner's allegations in the circumstances of this case
may tax credulity. But in view of their specific nature, their lack
of any necessary relation to the other threats alleged, and the fail.
ure of respondent to deny or to account for his failure to deny
them specifically, we cannot say that the issue was not one calling
for a hearing within the principles laid down in Walker v. Johnston, supra. If the allegations are found to be true, petitioner's
constitutional rights were infringed. For a conviction on a plea
of guilty coerced by a federal law enforcement officer is no more
consistent with due process than a conviction supported by a
coerced confession." 14
The Court ruled that habeas corpus was the proper remedy and
that an earlier denial of the writ did not operate as a bar, there having
been no hearing on the merits of the claim.
15
The remaining case, Hyslcr v. Florida,
differed from the others
in that it involved, not the confession of a defendant, but that of a confederate. It arose, not in review of the original conviction, but many
years later, on application for a writ coram nobis. In this respect it
resembled the Mooney case 16. And there was here, as there, the claim
that the authorities knew the accusation to be false. It will be recalled
that in the Mooney case the Supreme Court had found the claim in this
respect substantial enough to require a hearing; that it had, however,
directed that hearing to be held in the state courts; and that it had
finally refused to review the decision of the state court which denied
relief after the hearing. There the original proceeding had been in the
federal courts after the state courts had declared that the grounds
asserted afforded no basis for relief. Here the state courts recognized
a right to relief on the grounds asserted, but, according to the majority
of the Supreme Court, found that there was no substance to the claim
that any officials knew the accusation of defendant by his confederate
was false or that it had been obtained through coercion. The majority
of the Supreme Court ruled that this finding was justified and that the
F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 9th, I941).
13. Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257 (1942).
14. 62 Sup. Ct. 964, 965-966 (x942).
i5.62 Sup. Ct. 688 (1942).
12. 124

r6. MNooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. io3 (935); In re Mooney, to Cal. (2d) i,
73 P. (2d) 554 (1937). cert.orari denied, 305 U. S. 598 (1938) (Black and Reed
dissenting); Ex parte Mooney, 3o5 U. S. 573 (1938).
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due process clause requires only a fair apipraisal of the evidence by the
state court. Justices Black* Douglas and Murphy disagreed. They
concluded that it was'not essential that the officials had knowledge of
the falsity of the accusation, that it was enough to allege it had been
obtained by third degree methods. And they were unwilling to follow
the majority in its holding that, on that issue, there was no substance
to the claim ymade in the motion papers, particularly since, according to
them, the state court had not so ruled and had, in other cases, ordered
hearings without weighing the probable truth of the charges made.
Where such violent disagreement as this exists concerning the
basis of a state court's decision, one might well expect that, in a case
involving life and death, the majority would at least have sent the case
back to the state court for fresh consideration.
2. Jury Questions. The Supreme Court reiterated its oft-declared
rule that discrimination in the selection of jurors because of race would
result in reversal of conviction. 7 After the Scoitsboro case is had
again brought this issue into prominenice, the Court set aside a number
of convictions without extended discussion. 1 ' Apparently moved by
the continuation of discriminatory practices, in Hill v. Texas"0 the
Chief Justice wrote an opinion designed to redirect attention to this
evil. Yet, in the Waller case 2 the Court twice refused to grant review,
despite the claim-perhaps not properly presented-that there had been
discrimination in the selection of jurors en a class basis, defendant
having been an indigent sharecropper and only payers of the poll tax in
good standing having been accepted as jurors.
But in Glasserv. United States 22 the Court stated that the process
of jury selection should "comport with the concept of the jury as a
cross-section of the community." 2 There it had been charged that
the women on the panel had been taken from a list furnished to the
clerk by the League of Women Voters. Such a method of selection
was unanimously condemned. But the convictions of the defendants
were nevertheless affirmed (except, as we shall see, as to one of them
I7.3eginning with Strauder v. West Virginia, too U. S. 303 (3879).
iS. Norris v. Alabama, 29 U. S. 587 (x935).
i9.Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U. S.394 1935); Hale 'v. Kentucky, 303 U. S.
613 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S.
128 (1940).
:7o. 62 Sup. Ct. 1 59 (1942).
21. Wnalkr v.Ye'!l, 62 S up. Ct. I-o6 (1942) ; Ex partle Waller, 62 Sup. Ct. 1283
(xp). The Court also refused to consider a more direct attack upon the poll tax
hn t refused to review Pirtle v. Brown, ti8 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 6th, 194i), cert.
den:ed, 314 U. S. 621 (1941)
That case involved the right to vote at an election held
only for inmbers of Congress. in that respect differing from Brced!ove v.Suttles, 302
U. S.277 (v938); however, the Gicuit Court considcred this a difference of no consequence.
2. IySU. S. 6o (x942).
23. Id. at 86.
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and on different grounds) because at the trial the defendants had made
no attempt to prove their charges. In cases of this kind it is well to
remember that even when no denial of the charges is made, the defense
must actually offer to prove the facts when the case is called for trial.
This is ancient doctrine, 24 albeit technical.
3. The Right to Counsel. In the Glasser case, just cited, -one of
the defendants, Glasser, obtained a new trial in the light of peculiar
circumstances. This defendant, himself a lawyer, complained that the
lawyer he had chosen to represent him had, over his objection, beer.
assigned to represent a co-defendant whose interests were in part hostile
to Glasser's own. Mr. Justice Murphy held this to be a violation of the
constitutional guaranty, saying:
"The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations
as to the amount of prejudze resulting from its denial." 25
But the Court refused to set aside the conviction of the other defendant
represented by the same !awyer, apparently because he did not urge the
point and because the record showed no prejudice as to him. Justice
Frankfurter, with whom the Chief Justice agreed, saw no basis for this
decision. Both said that Glasser had not made the point of constitutional deprivation until long after the trial, that he had not objected
when the arrangement was finally made, although he had done so when
it was first suggested, and that no actual prejudice was shown. The
dissenters were motivated in part by the consideration that Glasser was
a lawyer experienced in criminal trials.
But in the case of Botts z. Brady 6 the majority of the Court by
Justice Roberts affirmed a conviction, even though defendant was altogether denied counsel. The difference here arose from the fact that
this was a state ease. The majority refused to read into the due
process clause of the 14th Amendment the precise requirements of the
6th.2 thus, perhaps, pursuing a course which may yield many abbera-

tions in the field of civil liberties. These may not be confined to procedhral rights, but may also run over into substantive fields, such as
free speech. They stem from the belief of many of the judges, Frankfurt(r in particular,28 that the states must be allowed wide latitude in
24. Sn;tb v. 'Mississippi, i62 U. S. 592 (J1i.6); Tarrance v. Flotida, 188 U. S.
-19 (19o) ; Plrownfietd v. South Carolina. 189 U. S. 426 (t9o3).
2q. (.;C.hser v. United States, 315 U. S. 6o, 76 (1942).

2. 62 Sup. Ct. 1252 (1942).
27. Justice. BlaOk rccognized that the Court had never yet

so held and cited dis-

5ezaiA", ol inions to the effect that it shotild have. 1d. at 1262, n. x.

:,,. In addition to the cases discusstd here which r,'flect that view, see Justi.e

Frat. jtcr's separait
1008, 1-12 (1942).

concurring opinion in Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 62 Sup. Ct.
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legislation as well as in procedure. The deci sion in this case was moti.ated in part by the fact that defendant had waived a jury trial and
had shown himself competent to conduct his own defense. The.majority stressed the fact that only a few of the thirteen original states had,
in. 1789, guaranteed the right to counsel by constitutional provision.
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissented on broad grounds,
stressing especially defendait's indigence. The views of the two sides
are well expressed by the following extracts from the opinions. Mr.
Justice Roberts said:
"As we have said, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while
want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction
lacking in such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the
amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for
any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice
accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel." n
Mr. Jubtice Black, on the other. hand, viewed the matter thus:
"A practice cannot be reconciled with 'common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right', which .subjects innocent men
to increased dangers of conviction merely because of their poverty. Whether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a
trial in which,'as here, denial of counsel has made it impossible
to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of certainty, that the
defendant's case was adequately presented. No one questions that
due process requires a hearing before conviction and.sentence for
the serious crime of robbery. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin said in 1859, '. . would it not be a little like mockery
to secuie to a pauper these solemn constitutional guaranties for a
fair and full trial of the matters with which he was charged, and
yet say to him on trial, that he must employ his own counsel, who
could alone render these guaranties of any real permanent value
to him

....

Why this great solicitude to secure him a fair trial

if he cannot have the benefit of counsel?'

Carpenter v. Dane

County, 9 Wis. 274, 276, 277.

"Denial to the poor of the request for counsel in proceedings
based on charges of serious crime has long been regarded as shocking to the 'universal sense of justice' throughout this country." 30
4. Wiretapping. In Goldnan v. United States 3" the Supreme
Court was called on to reconsider its five to four ruling in the Ohvislead
case 32 that wiretapping was not forbidden by the Fo-uith Aunee::dment.
29. i"-ts v. Prady, 62 Sup. Ct.
So. I.I. - t

z263.

1252, 1262 (1942).

31. 62 Svp. Ct. c93 (94).
1-. 277 U.S. ,3 (5 ), (HolmCS, BrandeK, .uflr, and Stone, J. J.,
dls-enting),

(;9.A) 77 U. wr 1Pi. L R~v. i39.
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It refused to do so. The question arose in a case which involved not
wiretapping, but a device known as a detectaphone. This instrument
consists of a microphone placed on the outside of a dividing wall
between two rooms. It is so delicate that listeners in one of the rooms
can hear ordinary conversations held in the next. By its use several
lawyers were convicted of a bankruptcy fraud. They claimed a violation of the Fourth Amendment, on the ground that the placing of the
microphone had been made possible by an earlier, unlawful, entry into
the room in which the conversation took place. On this point the trial
court and Circuit Court 3 3 ruled against them on the facts and the
Supreme Court refused to review the evidence. Defendants urged
also that, regardless of the Ornstead case, the use of a detectaphone
was the equivalent of an illegal search, because they had intended not
to project their voices outside the room in which they were. This, said
the majority, by Justice Roberts was a "distinction too nice for the
practical application of the constitutional guaranty." On this point
only Justice Murphy dissented, saying that it could hardly be doubted
that the use of the device was a "direct invasion of the privacy of the
occupant."
On the main issue the majority said that nothing could."profitably" be added to what had been said in the Olmstead case. The Chief
Justice and Justice Frankfurter filed a brief memorandum to the effect
that they would have been "happy" to join in overruling the earlier
decision, had there been a majority ready to do so. But Justice
Murphy wrote an extended dissent in which he stressed the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment as guaranteeing privacy and pointed out that
the Supreme Court had not restricted broad constitutional principles to
the literal scope of the language used. In view of the change in the
manner of carrying out business and personal affairs, the protection
afforded by the Fourth Amendment should also be extended. He said:
"Whether the search of private quarters is accomplished by placing on the outer walls of the sanctum a detectiphone that transmits to the outside listener the intimate details of a private conversation, or by new methods of photography that penetrate walls
or overcome distances, the privacy of the citizen is equally invaded
by agents of the Government and intimate personal matters are
laid bare to view. Such invasions of privacy, unless they are
authorized by a warrant issued in the manner and form prescribed
by the Amendment or otherwise conducted under adequate safeguards defined by statute, are at one with the evils which have
heg.tofore been held to be within the F6urth Amendment and
equally call for remedial action." 34
-3. i8 F. (.-d)

31o (C. C. A. 2d 194z).

St.tes, 62 Sup. Ct 99,998 (x
3- Gcd1,n v. U,.'-i

).
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And he thus indicated the fallacy of the Olmstead case decision:
"The error of the stultifying construction there adopted is best
shown by the results to which it leads. It is strange doctrine that
keeps inviolate the most mundane observations entrusted to the
permanence of paper but allows the revelation of thoughts uttered
within the sanctity of private quarters, thoughts perhaps too intimate to be set down even in a secret diary, or indeed, utterances
about which the common law drew the cloak of privilege-the
most confidential revelations between husband and wife, client and
lawyer, patient and physician, and penitent and spiritual adviser.
Nor can I see any rational basis for denying to the modern means
of communication the same protection that is extended by the
Amendment to the sealed letter in the mails." 33
That Justices Black and Douglas should not have concurred in this
dissent and so made it a majority decision, is hard to explain. It may
be that they were influenced by Justice Roberts' Pearl Harbor report 36
which was published a few days before the argument and was relied on
by the government. The fear that conduct of the war might be-hampered if unrestricted wiretapping were declared unconstitutional seems,
however, far fetched in view of Congress' long continued unwillingness
to amend the Communications Act as requested by the administration
and permit wiretapping by certain government agencies.37 Moreover,
overruling the Olbstead case would not have denied all possibility of
wiretapping. As Justice Murphy pointed out, referring to procedure
adopted in New York, a8 wiretapping under judicial scrutiny, analogous
to the search warrant procedure, would not be unreasonable and, therefore, not forbidden.
A different aspect of wiretapping was decided in Goldstein v.
United States.39 There complaint was made that a confederate had
een induced to testify, by being confronted by wiretaps. Since none
of the wires of any of the defendants had been tapped, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,40 ruled that these defendants
could not complain of the tapping which had occurred. In a five to
three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Roberts again
wrote for the majority and Justice Murphy for the minority. This
time the Chief Justice and Justice Frankfurter agreed with the latter.
(Justice Jackson took no part in this case, nor in the Goldwan case.)
The majority took the view that only tbose whose convecations had
35. Id. at ooW.
36. N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1942, p. 1, col. &
37. See S. 3756, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (1938); H. R. 266 77th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1940); H. R. 3699, 4228, 7yth Cong. ist Sess. (94').
38. N. Y. Const. Art. x, § 12 (as amended 1938).
39. 62 Sup. Ct. xooo (942).
40. i2o F. 2nd, 485 (941).
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been overheard could complain of the violation of the Communications
Act, just as only those whose property had been seized could complain
of a violation of the Fourth Amendment 41 (a point on which the
Supreme Court had, however, never previously spoken); that the use
of testim6ny obtained in the manner complained o'f might be a violation of the law did not render the testimony itself inadmissible; only
the intercepted communications or information obtained from them
were barred, and here these were not used at the trial. The dissent
took issue with both propositions of the majority. Justice Murphy
argued that, whether or not the rule under the Fourth Amendment was
sound, the language of the Communications Act 42 forbade all use of
intercepted material. He said:
"It is immaterial, for the object to be served by that section,
whether objection is made by the one sending the communication
or by another who is prejudiced by its use. The rule that evidence
obtained by a violation of § 6o5 is inadmissible is not a remedy for

the sender; it is the obedient answer to the Congressional command that society shall not be plagued with such practices as
wire-tapping." 43
5. Miscellaneous. There remains Cochran v. KaniaS4 4 in which
the Court unanimously reversed a state denial of habeas corpus. Many
years after conviction, a prisoner, sentenced for life, sought a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that he had been denied essential rights
at his trial and then deprived of an opportunity to appeal. The state
court rejected his plea, on the ground that he had been represented by
counsel and the record of the trial did not bear out the claim of denial
of any rights. But, said Mr. Justice Black, this did not affect the claim
with regard t6 the suppression of the appeal; if true, it constituted a
denial of equal protection-apparently on the ground that other prisoners were otherwise treated, although the opinion does not disclose the
particulars. Accordingly, this case was remanded to the state court
for the purpose of inquiring into the truth of the claim.
B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Ti'ree new subjects received constitutional protection: publications charged with contempt of court, travel from state to state, and
sterilization. On the other hand, the right to distribute leaflets, recently
g-iv-2n broad piotection, was severely curtailed. For the first time, the
41x.

S."eConvolly v. Mcdalie, 58 P. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 2d, 932).
42. AS SrAT. 1103 (.193.. -17 -. S. C. A. 605 (Supp. 1941).
A3. .Aotda v. Unted .t.s, 62 Sup. Ct. Iooo, ico6, 1oo7 (1942).

4. 62 Sup. Ct m53 (1942).
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Court considered employers' rights of free speech under the National
Labor Relations Act.
x. Peonage. We deal first with Taylor v. Georgia45 a unanimous
decision which reaffirmed Bailey v. Alabanma.4" It held void under the
Thirteenth Amendment a state law which punished the making of a.
contract to perform services with intent not to perform them and to
obtain something of value, because the statute created a presumption
that the failure to perform or to return what was paid established the
wrongful intent at the time of making the contract. Such a law, said
Justice Byrnes, creates forced labor, a condition forbidden by the constitution. There is no basis, he held, for assuming that breach of the
contract establishes fraudulent intent at the time of making it. He
rejected an attempt made to distinguish the Bailey case on the ground
that there the accused was forbidden to make a statement as to his
motives while here he was allowed to make such a statement, though.
not under oath. That factor Justice Byrnes held not controlling.
. Travel from State to State. Whether the right to move freely
from state to state is protected by the federal constitution, and, if so,
under which of its provisions, has for some time been uncertain. 47 The
question lia assumed new importance in recent years due to the depression and the migration of needy persons in search.of work, or even of'
better relief. A case arising in New York failed in an attempt to test
the question, on account of.procedural complications 4 8 There was
involved a statute permitting removal to the state of origin of one who
applied for relief. In the case which finally reached the Supreme
Court, Edwards v. California,4 the -statute made it a criminal offense
to bring an indigent person into the state with knowledge of his indigence. The Supreme Court unanimously held the California law void,
but it split five to four in assigning reasons for' so doing. The majority, by Justice Byrnes, rested its decision on the commerce clause; Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy, speaking by Justice Douglas, rested
their views on the privileges and immunities clause of the i4th Amendment; Justice Jackson thought that both grounds were possible, but
preferred the latter.
Justice Byrnes rejected the contention of the state that it had
power to exclude paupers, but did not refer to the problem presented
45. 315 U. S. 25 (1942).
46. 219 U. S. 219 (1919).
.7. See Crandall v. Xevada, 6 Wal. 35 (U. S. x868); Williams v. Fears, 179
U. ,. ";o (ig0o) ; Whceler v. United States, 2_54 U. S. 281 (192o) ; Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U. S. 404 (1935). (x936) 84 U. os PA. L. RPy. 655.
.A
,tter
i
of Chirillo, 283 N. Y. 417 (I9.1o); see also Chrillo v. Lehman, 312
U. 662 (194!).
49. 34 U. S. x6o (i941).
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by the New York law concerning the power of a state to expel them.
He pointed ofit, however, that under modern conditions poor relief was
no longer a wholly local problem and that the policy adopted by California would lead to retaliation. He rejected the view expressed over
a century ago that paupers could be classed with infectious artides, 40
saying:
"Whatever may have been the notion then prevailing; we do not
think that it will now be seriously contended that because a person
is without employment and without funds he constitutes a 'moral
pestilence.' Poverty and immorality are not synonymous." 51
Justice Douglas expressed no opinion on the commerce aspects of
the case, as Justice Byrnes had expressed none on the privileges and
immunities clause. But Justice Douglas said that the right of human
beings to move freely should occupy a "more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and
coal." He insisted that this right was one of national citizenship and,
therefore, protected by the i4th Amendment. He rejected the notion
that the state could curtail the movement of the destitute:
"But to allow such an exception to be engrafted on the rights of
national citizenship would be to contravene every conception of
national unity. It would also introduce a caste system utterly incompatible with the spirit of our system of government. It would
permit those who were stigmatized by a State as indigents, paupers,
or vagabonds to be relegated to an inferior class of citizenship.
It would prevent a citizen because he was poor from seeking new
horizons in other States. It might thus withhold from large segments of our.people that mobility which is basic to any guarantee
of freedom of opportunity. The result would be a substantial
dilution of the rights of nrational citizenship, a serious impairment
of the principles of equality." 1Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that the states were bound to
receive aliens admitted by the national government: 53 could the rights
of citizens be less? If so, then "the world is even more upside down
than I had supposed it to be." On the subject of indigence he said:
"Any measure which would divide our citizenry on the basis
of property into one class frec to move from state to state and
another class that is poverty-l-otnd to the place where it has suffered misfortune is not only at war with the habit and custom by
which our country has expandcd, bitt is also a short-sighted blow
So. As said in New York v. Miln, ii Pet. 103, 149 (U. S. 1837).
51. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. i6o, 177 (1941).
52. Id. at ii.

53. Tniax v. Raich,

239

U. S. 33 ('9'S).
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at the security of property itself. Property can have no more dangerous, even if unwitting, enemy than one who would make its
possession a pretext for unequal or exclusive civil rights. Where
those rights are derived from national citizenship no state may
impose such a test, and whether the Congress could do so we are
not called upon to inquire. . . . A contention that a citizen's duty

to render military service is suspended by 'indigence' would meet
with little favor. Rich or penniless, Duncan's citizenship under
the Constitution pledges his strength to the defense of California
as a part of the United States, and his right to migiate to any part
of the land he must defend is something she must respect under
the same instrument. .Unless this Court is willing to say that citizenship of the United States means at least this much to the citizen,
then our heritage of constitutional privileges and immunities is
only a promise to the. ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." "
3. Contempt of Court. The punishment of out-of-court publications as contempts has been a much criticized feature of our judicial
system.- 5 Until now, the United States Supreme Court had refused
to interfere with instances arising from the states 5s and had even
emasculated federal law intended to afford a measure of protection1s
But at t*e 194o Term, in Nye v. United States" the Court had
receded from the latter position, and, by hearing argument in the
Bridges and Los Angeles Times cases "9 had given indication of
a possible change in its attitude toward state prosecutions. These
two cases were, however, not decided then, but were reargued during
the following October. And, on the day after Pearl Harbor, in a 5 to
4 decision, the Court for the first iime set aside a punishment for
conteinpt as in violation of the guarantees of freedom of speech and of
the press. Justice Black wrote for the majority; Justice Frankfurter
for the minority, consisting, besides himself, of the Chief Justice,
justice Robertt and Justice Byrnes. But, despite harsh language in the
minority opinion, the disagreement was not fundamental. For all the
minority judges agreed with the majority in setting aside the convictions based on two of the three editorials involved in the Los Angeles
•Times case. Thus the Court was unanimofis in pronouncing the principle that it woild scrutinize convictions for contempt to assure protection for freedom of speech. The Judges differed in the formula to be
applied in giving this protection.
54.'Edwards v. California, 314 U. S.i6o, z8, 186 (:94z).
s-. See Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication (1928) 28 Cor- L. Rzv. 52_.
56. Patterson v.*Colorado, 2o5 U. S. 454 (1907).
57. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 402 (1g8).
S8. 313 U. S. 33 ('94').
59. Bridges v. CalifOrnia, 314 U. S. 252 (z94t). These cases were first argued
in October xg4o, and were set down for re-argument in October 1941.
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Justice Black rejected the "reasonable tendency" test applied by
the state court and insisted on the application of the "clear and present
danger" test urged by the defendants. He said:
"What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger'
cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to
mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a
minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits 'any law abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press.' It must be taken as a
command of the broadest scope" that explicit language, read in the
context of a liberty-oving society, will allow." 60
To this Justice Frankfurter answered:
"Of course freedom of speech and of the press are essential
to the enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those who
wield power. Particularly should this freedom be employed in
comment upon the work of courts.who are without many influences
oidinarily making for humor and humility, twin antidotes to the
corrosion of power. Butthe Bill of Rights is not self-destructive.
Freedom of expression can hardly carry implications that nullify
the guaranteees of impaitial trials. And since courts are the ultimate resorts for vindicating the Bill of Rights, a state may surely
authorize appropriate historic means to assure that the process for
such vindication be not wrenched from its rational tracks into the
more primitive melee of passion and pressure. The need is great
that courts be criticized but just as great that they be allowed to
do their duty.
"The Constitution, as we have recently had occasion to
remark, is not a formulary. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311
U. S. 435, 444, 85 L. ed. 267, 279, 61 S. Ct. 246, 13o ALR 1229.
Nor does it require displacement of an historic test by a phrase
which first gained currency on March 3, 1919. Schenck v. United
States, 249 US 47, 63 L. ed. 470, 39 S. Ct. 247. Our duty is not
ended with the recitation of phrases that are the short-hand of a
complicated historic process. The phrase 'clear and present danger' is merely a justification for curbing utterance where that is
warranted by the substantive evil to be prevented. The phrase
itself is an expression of tendency and not of accomplishment, and
the literary difference between it and 'reasonable tendency' is not
of constitutional dimension." 61
The real difference here between the judges' opinions can be
understood only by reference to the character of the publications about
60. Id. at 263.
61. Id. at 284, 295.
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which they disagieed. One of these was a telegram, sent by larry
Bridges to Secretary of Labor Perkins, characterizing as "outrageous"
a state court decision in a labor controversy and intimating that a strike
might result if the decision were carried out. Actually, it was for the
publication of that telegram in the local press while a motion for a new
trial was pending that Bridges was charged with contempt. The other
publication was an editorial in the Los Angeles Times which denounced
two persons who had been convicted and, before they were to be sentenced, stated that the judge in the case would "make a serious mistake"
if he granted probation and failed to send them to prison. justice
Frankfurter held that both these publications were direct threats to the
freedom of action of the judge involved, and that, therefore, they denied
to the litigants the impartial adjudication to which they were entitled:
"Here there was a real and substantial manifestation of an
endeavor to exert outside influence. A powerful newspaper
brought its full coercive power to bear in demanding a particular
sentence. If such sentence had been imposed readers might assume
that the court had been influenced in its action; if lesser punishment had been imposed, at least a portion of the community niight
be stirred.to resentment. It cannot be denied that even a judge
may be affected by such a quandary. We canriot say that the state
court was out of bounds in conchiding that such conduct offends
the free course of justice. Comment after the imposition of sentence--criticism, however unrestrained, of its severity or lenience
or disparity, cf. Ambard v. Atty, Gen. (1936) AC 322, is an
exercise of the right of free discussion. But to deny the states
power to check a serious attempt at dictating from without the
sentence to be imposed in a pending case, is to deny the right to
impartial justice as it was cherished by the founders of the Republic and by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. It would
erect into a constitutional right opportunities for abuse of utterance
interfering with the dispassionate exercise of the judicial function."
"The publication of the telegram was regarded by the state
supreme court as 'a threat that if an attefmpt was made to enforce
the decision, the ports of the entire Pacific Coast would be tied up!
and 'a direct challenge to the court that 'II,ooo longshoremen on
the Pacific Coast would not abide by its decision.' This occurred
immediately after counsel had moved to set aside the judgment
which was criticized, so unquestionably there was a threat to litigation obviously alive. It would be inadmissible dogmatism for
us to say that in the context of the immediate case-the issues at
stake, the environment in which the judge, the petitioner and the
community were moving, the publication here made, at the time
and in the manner it was made--this could not have dominated the
mind of the judge before whom the matter was pending." 62
62. Id. at 3W,30o.
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Justice Black thought, on the other hand, that the possibility the judges
in question might have. been influenced was remote. He pointed out
that it was the nature of the cases themselves which raised the element
of pressure:*
"It must be recognized that public interest is much more likely
to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however penetrating, of the historian or scientist. Since
they punish utterances made during the pendency of a case, the
judgments below therefore produce their restrictive results at the
precise time when public interest in the matters discussed would
naturally be at its height. Moreover, the ban is likely to fall not
only at a crucial time but upon the most important topics of discussion. Here, for example, labor controversies were the topics of
some of the publications. Experience shows that the more acute
labor controversies are, the more likely it is that in some aspect
they will get into court. It is therefore the controversies that command most interest that the decisions below would remove from
the arena of public discussion.
"No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the
freedom there guaranteed for speech and the press bears an inverse
ratio to the timeliness and importance of the ideas seeking expression. Yet, it would follow as a practical result of the decisions
below that anyone who might wish to give public expression to his
views on a pending case involving no matter what problem of
public interest, just at the time his audience would be most receptive, would be as effectively discouraged as if a deliberate statutory
scheme of censorship had been adopted. Indeed, perhaps more so,
because under a legislative specification of the particular kinds of
expressions prohibited and the circumstances under which the
prohibitions are to operate, the speaker or publisher might at least
have an authoritative guide to the permissible scope of comment,
instead of being compelled to act at the peril that judges might find
in
the utterance
pending
case." 62a reasonable tendency' to obstruct justice in a
4- Sterilization. In Skinner v. Oklahoma6 4 the Court unanimously held void a law permitting the sterilization of criminals, although, again, there was difference in the reasons given. The majority,
through Justice Douglas, relied on the equal protection clause because
the law excepted certain crimes from its scope: thus sterilization was
permitted of one convicted of common law larceny, but not of one convicted for embezzlement. Concerning the power to sterili7e, Mr. Justice
Douglas said:
"We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The power
63. Id. at .6S-269.

61- 6z Sup. Ct. izzo (i94).
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to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.
There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches.
Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable
injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. We mention
these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the
States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that
strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in
violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws." 45
The Chief Justice thought the law bad due to its lack of machinery
whereby the convict could obtain a judicial hearing on the appropriateness of sterilization in his case. He distinguished an earlier case 6, in
which the Court had upheld a sterilization law dealing with imbeciles
because that law hed provided such machinery. He said:
"Science has found and the law has recognized that there are
certain types of mental deficiency associated with delinquency
which are inheritable. But the State does not contend-nor can
there be any pretense-that either common knowledge or experience, or scientific investigation has given assurance that the criminal tendencies of any class of habitual offenders are universally
or even generally inheritable. In such circumstances, inquiry
whether such is the fact in the'case of any particular individual
cannot rightly be dispensed with. Whether the procedure by
which a statute carries it mandate into execution satisfies due
process is a matter of judicial cognizance. A law which condemns, without hearing, all the individuals of a class to so harsh
a measure as the present because some or even many merit condemnation, is lacking in the first principles of due process." 6T
Mr. Justice Jackson believed the law was bad on both counts and
expressed doubts about the validity of any broad sterilization laws.
5. Leaflet Distribution. Several years ago the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional ordinances designed to restrict the distribution of
leaflets both from house to house and on the public streets. In Lovell
v. Grifflin s it voided such an ordinance, dn the ground that it gave
officials powers of censorship; and in Schneider v. Imington6 9 it set
aside three ordinances which completely banned all street distribution
and voided one ordinance which affected house to house canvassing for
religious purposes because it gave the municipal authorities censorial
powers. In neither case was it considered material that contributions
65. Id. at 1113.

66. Buck v. Bell. 274 U. S. 200 (O2).
67. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 62 Sup. Ct.
68. 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
69. 308 V. S. 147 (1939).

11o,

i15 (194z).
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were asked by the distributors." At this term the Court was confronted
with two new questions: Did these decisions apply to leaflets of commercial character? Did they prevent the exaction of a license fee. at
least where money passed? To both questions the Court gave a negative answer. In I'-alentine -,..
Chrestensen71 it unanimously upheld a
New York City ordinance which c6mpletely forbade the distribuiion of
commercial leaflets on the streets. Mr. Justice Roberts simply said
that the constitution "imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising."
On the other question the Court divided five to four. Justice
Reed wrote for the majority, the Chief Justice and Justice Murphy
both wrote opinions concurred in by each other and by Justices Black
and Douglas, and a memorandum was also filed, concurred in by
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy. The problem arose in three
cases, all involving Jehovah's witnesses. These preachers of their
own interpretation of the Bible are accustomed to distribute religious
leaflets, both on the streets and from house to house. Sometimes
they ask a price for the leaflets, sometimes they request a contribution for their work, sometimes they give the leaflets away. In
many places they have been arrested for failure to comply with local
ordinances requiring licenses for "peddling." The courts have differed
widely when 'onfronted with this situation. Sometimes the ordinances
have been held inapplicable, on the ground that the accused were not
peddling.72 In some states the courts have declared such ordinances
unconstitutional as restrictive of religious freedom; 3 in others, on the
ground that they violated freedom of the press. 74 In Alabama,7 5
Arizona 7e and Arkanjsas. 77 however, the ordinances were upheld as
7o. That element existed in both these cases.
71. 62 Sup. Ct. 920 (z942). The Court also overruled the contention that the leaf.
let was not commercial because on one side it protested against actions of the municipal
authorities.
72. State ex rel Hough v. Woodruff, 147 Fla. 299, 25 (2d) 577 (1941); Thomas
v.City of Atlanta, ;9 Ga. App. 50, i S. E. (2d) 598 (1939) ; State ex rcl. Semansky v.
Stark, 196 La. 3o7, 199 So. 129 (1940) ; City of Shreveport v. Teague, 8 So. (2d) (I.a.
t42); People v. Finkelstein. 170 Misc. 188, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 941 (N. Y. 1939);
City of Cincinnati v. Mosier, 61 Ohio App. 81, na N. E. (2d) 418 0939); State v.
Nteredith. 197 S. C. 351. i5S. E. (2d) 678 (i94i). See contra cases cited in notes
.;-77 infra; Buscy v. Dist. of Cblumbia, 45 F. (2d) - (App. D. C. 1942) (Rutledge
di.senting), application for certiorari pending.
73. State c.r rcl Hough v. Woodruff, 147 Fla. 209, 2 S. (2d) 577 (941) ; Thomas
v. City of Atlanta, 59 Ga. App. So, i S. E. (2d) 598 (1939).
74. Village of South Holland v. Stein, 373 Ill.
472, -6 N. E. (2d) 868 (194o);
City of Blue Island v. Kozul. 379 Ill.
511 (1942) ; Herder v. Shahad;, 125 N. J. L
153. 14 A. (2d) 475 (194o) : People v. Banks, 168 Misc. 5s. 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 41 (N. Y.
i038)" City of Cincinnati v. Mosier, 61 Ohio App. 81, 22 N. E. (2d) 418 (1939);
Comm. v. Reid. 2o A. (2d) 841 (Pa. 1941) ; State Y. Greaves, 112 Vt. 222 (1941);
McConkey v. City of Fredericksburg, 179 Va. 556 (1942).
7.- Jones v. Opelika. 241 Ala. 279 3 S. (2d) 76 (*941).
76. State v. Jobin. 118 P. (2d) 97 (Ariz. 194).
77. Cole v. Fort Smith.-02 Ark. 614, 151 S. W. (2d) iooo (,o41) (as the State
Court reversed Cole's conviction the case was taken to the Supreme Court under the
name of Bowden, apother defendant).
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appropriate exercises of the power of taxation. These cases were
Opdika."
decided by the Supreme Court under the name of Jones -,.
The majority opinion proceeded on the assumption that the ordinances were regulatory and that the fees exacted constituted compensation for policing. It left open the question whether the amounts
exacted were reasonable-indicating that to determine that question
proof would have to be forthcoming concerning the volume of sales,
the margin of profit and the cost of policing. Mr. Justice Reed stated
that the distribution of the leaflets accompanied by the passing of
money was "incidental" to the exercise of religion or freedom of the
press; that the "sales" partook more "of commercial than religious or
educational transactions," that "ordinary commercial methods" were
used to raise propaganda funds. He rejected the contention raised
in the Jones case, itself, that the ordinance there was void because it
gave the licensing authority arbitratory power to revoke, saying that
the hazard was "too contingent."
The minority attacked all the assumptions of the majority, pointing out that the ordinances did not purport to exact compensation for
services rendered, that they were not regulatory, that the state courts
had not sustained them on either such theory. The Chief Justice, in
particular, ihought that the ordinance in the Jones case was void
because of the arbitrary power to revoke, considering it a "more callous
disregard of the constitutional right" than exhibited in the Lovell case
-for here an applicant might pay for a license only to have it taken
away at once. Both dissenting opinions stressed the substantial amount
of the fees exacted, pointing out that, at least in one case, the amount
in relation to population was prohibitive. The Chief Justice rejected
the concept implicit in the majority opinion that only discriminatory
attempts to wipe out the free exercise of speech or religion were
unconstitutional:
"On the contrary the Constitution, by virtue of the First and
the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred pob-ition. Their commands are not restricted to cases where
the protected privilege is sought out for attack. They extend at
least to every form of taxation which, because it is a condition of
the exercise of the privilege, is capable of being used to control or
suppress it." 79
Chief Justice Stone believed that flat license taxes were void because
they restrained and tended to suppress the activities taxed:
"It seems fairly obvious that if the present taxes, laid in
small communities upon peripatetic religious propagandists, are
.62 Sup. Ct. z23 (1942).
,9.Id. at 1244.
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to be sustained, a way has been found for the effective suppression
of speech and press and religion despite constitutional guaranties. The very taxes now before us are better adapted to that
end than were the stamp taxes which so successfully curtailed the
dissemination of -ideas by eighteenth century newspapers and
pamphleteers, and %hich were a moving cause of the American
Revolution."

So

Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a -comprehensive opinion dealing with
the cases both from the point of view of freedom of the press and
freedom of religion. As to the first, he said:
"It matters not that petitioners asked contributions for their
literature. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press cannot
and must not mean freedom only for those who can distribute
their broadsides without charge. There -may be others with messages more vital but purses less full, who must seek some reimbursenient for their outlay or else forego passing on their ideas.
The pamphlet, an historic weapon against oppression, . . . is
today the convenient vehicle of those with limited resources
because newspaper space and radio time are expensive and the

cost of establishing such enterprises great. If freedom of speech
and freedom of the press are to have any concrete meaning, people

seeking to distribute information and opinion, to the end only that
others shall have the benefit thereof, should not be taxed for circulating such matter." 8t

As to the second, he concluded:
"By applying these occupational taxes to petitioners' noncommercial activities, respondents now tax sincere efforts to
spread religious beliefs, and a heavy burden falls upon a new set
of itinerant zealots, the Witnesses. That burden should not be
allowed to stand, especially if, as the excluded testimony in No.
2So indicates, the accepted clergymen of the town can take to
their pulpits and distribute their literature without the impact of
taxation. Liberty of conscience is too full of meaning for the
individuals in this nation to permit taxation to prohibit or substantially impair the spread of religious ideas, even though they
are coiitroversial and run counter to the established notions of a
community. Ifthis Court is to err in evaluating claims that freedori of speech. freedom of the press. and freedom of religion have
lx.en invaded, far better that it err in being overprotective of

these precious rights." 82

Finally, an opinion filed by justices Black, Douglas and Murphy
indicated their belief that this decision was a further step in the direcSo. Id. at 1245.
Sx. Id. at 1249.
82. Id. at 1251.
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tion the Court had taken in the flag salute case 83 (in which they had
concurred with the majority). They stated their present belief that
that case had been wrongly decided and said:
"Certainly our democratic form of government functioning

under the historic Bill of Rights has a high responsibility to
accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities however
unpopular and unorthodox those views may be."' 4
In view of this decision it is not surprising that the Court refued
to review a conviction for violation of a village ordinance which prohibited house to house circulation of leaflets without the consent of the
householder, though it excepted from its provisions distribution by
persons who had been residents of the village for more than six
months.".
6. Other Free Speech cases. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
another Jehovah's witness case, the Court unanimously upheld a conviction for breach of the peace based upon a charge that defendant
called a policeman a fascist and racketeer. Justice Murphy pointed out
that certain kinds of speech are not protected, including "fighting"
words, and that the words here used were likely to cause retaliation

and breaches of the peace. He held that 'no constitutional issue was
raised by the state court's refusal to allow evidence of provocation.
And in N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.81 the Court
considered'the troublesome problem of an employer's right to discuss
labor questions with his employees. The Labor Board had found that
the employer was guilty of unfair practices, in part because of certain
of its statements, in part because of other activities showing hostility
to the union. The Court unanimously sent the case back to the Board,
because it could not be sure whether it was the statements alone which
had determined the result. The Court said that the statements could
not by themselves be considered coercive, but pointed out that the
Board had the power so to consider them in the light of all the circumstances. On the rights of the employer to discuss matters with his
employees Justice Murphy said:
"Neither the Act nor the Board's order here enjoins the
employer from expressing its view on labor policies or problems,
nor is a penalty imposed upon it because of iiny utterances which
83. Minersville School District v. "Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (594o).

dissented.
84. Jones v. Opelika, 62 Sup. Ct. 123t, 1251-12 _2 (1942).
85. Bolnke v. People, 287 N. Y. 154, 38 N. E. (2d) 478 (1941),

Sup. Ct. 1o

(1942).

86. 62 Sup. Ct. -66 (942).

8. 314 V. S. 469 (1941).

Stone alone

cert. denied, 62
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it has made. The sanctions of the Act are imposed not in punishment of the employer but for the protection of the employees.
The employer in this case is as free now as ever to take any side
it may choose on this controversial issue.

But, certainly, conduct,

though evidenced in part.by speech, may amount, in connection
with other circumstances, to coercion within the meaning of the
Act. If the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his
employees in their free choice, then those employees are entitled
to the protection of the Act. And in determining whether a
course of conduct amounts to restraint or coercion, pressure
exerted vocally by the employer may no more be disregarded than
pressure exerted in other ways.""
C. LABOR CASES

Here, as in both the other fields, at this Term, the court handed
down restrictive rulings in two five-to-four decisions. Its other rulings in this area were, however, unanihous. They dealt with the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Wisconsin Labor Relations Board and
injunctions against picketing in general.
x. The Norris-LaGuardiaAct. In Columbia River PackersAss'n
v. Hinton 89 the Court, by Justice Black, held inapplicable the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to a controversy between a corporation engaged in canning fish and an association of fishermen affiliated
with the C. I. 0. The decision rested on the fact that the fishermen
were not employed by the canner but sold their catch to it through the
"'union." The controversy concerned "the terms of a contract for the
sale of fish," not "terms or conditions of employment; the fishermen
neither were, nor sought to be employees." So the statutory definition
had no application.
2. The Wisconsin Labor Relations Board. In two cases, Hotel &
Rest. Empl. s: IV. E. R. B.90 and Allen-Bradley Local v. TV. E. R. B. 91
the Supreme Court rejected contentions that orders of the state board,
insofar as they interfered with activities of labor unions, were unconstitutional. In the first case the board had forbidden all picketing, but
the state court had ruled that only violence, not peaceful picketing, could
be forbidden by the statute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that, so
limited, freedom of speech had not been interfered with.
The second case involved mass picketing and also a contention
that the state law interfered with the workings of the National Labor
M Id. at 4:77.
89. 315 U. S. 143 (1942).
go. 62 Sup. Ct. 7o6 (x942).
94. 62 Sup. Ct. 820 (1942).
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Relations Act, on the ground that the employer was engaged in interstate commerce. Mr. Justice Douglas said that, since the National
Board had not assumed jurisdiction and the order enforced by the
state court was limited to a prohibition of mass picketing and various
unlawful acts, there was no conflict. But he intimated that some of
the provisions of the Wisconsin law were in conflict with federal policy.
3.Injunctions. Bakery & Pastry Drivers v. 1[7ohd19 2 and Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Riftter's Cafe Isboth involved the validity
of injunctions against peaceful picketing issued by state courts. In the
first case the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the state decision,
in the second it upheld that decision by a sharply divided court. The
Wold case arose out of attempts by a union to persuade distributors of
milk who did their own work seven days a week, to employ a union
driver as a relief man one day a week, and resulted in an injunction
against the picketing of manufacturers who sold to the distributors and
retailers to whom they sold. In the Ritter case a union picketed at his
place of business the owner of real estate on which a building was
being erected by non-union labor; the injunction prohibited only that
picketing and rested on the state's anti-trust law. The Supreme Court
reached different conclusions in these two eases'because the majority
belieted that in the first, but not the second case, the person picketed
had a-substantial relation to the labor dispute involved.
In the Wold case the New York Courts 94 had reached the conclusion that the controversy was not a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the New York anti-injunction law.95 So clearly did an injunction in such a situation seem a denial of constitutional guarantees, that
the Supreme Court at first summarily reversed. 6 Presumably because
of the later pendency of'the Ritter case, that decision was vacated and
argument heard. The final decision, however, adhered to the earlier
one, though with some difference among the judges concerning the.
applicable principles.
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote the chief opinion. He rejected the
notion that a decision that the case presented no labor dispute under
the state law determined the legality of the injunction. -Inview of the
finding that there had been neither violence nor threat of violence, he
also rejected the interpretation of the case later placed on it by the
92. 62 Sup. Ct. 8M6 (1942).
93. 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (xI2).
94. N4 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (1939), affd.,

788,31 N. E. (2d) 765 (z940.
9-. N. Y. Crn%Paacricz Acr §876-a.
96- 313 U.S. 548 (94).
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New York Court of Appeals as an attempt to "coerce." 97 He concluded that there was no evil here sufficiently serious to justify restrictions on free speech. * And that while the state might sometimes limit
even peaceful picketing, here the repercussions on strangers to the controversy were too slight to justify any restriction.
Mr. Justice Douglas protested because he feared the opinion might
be interpreted as limited to situations in which the picketing was ineffective and as permitting injunctions when it was otherwise. A decision
like this seemed to him a basic departure from the Thornhill case. 98
To make the result turn on the possible coercive effect of the picketing
would be to destroy the protection given to peaceful picketing by that
decision. He recognized, however, that regulation by the state was
proper to prevent abuse, since picketing involved more than free speech.
Justices Black and Murphy joined with him.
The real cleavage in the Court became dear in the Ritter case,
decided the same day. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion. Justice Black wrote a dissent concurred in by Justices Douglas
and Murphy; Justice Reed filed a separate dissent of his own.
The majority upheld the power of a state to determine questions
of policy for itself, and concluded that a state might properly confine
picketing to an area having relation to the dispute -involved-the
emphasis being not so much on the fact that the place picketed was
physically distant from the place where the work was being done, as
upon the fact that the person picketed was not involved in the 'dispute.
Justice Frankfurter contended that the real dispute was with the contractor who was erecting the building, not with the owner of the land.
He said:
"But recognition of peaceful picketing as an exercise of free
speech does not imply that the states must be without power to
confine the sphere of communication to that directly related to the
dispute. Restriction of picketing to the area of the industry
within which a labor dispute arises leaves open to the disputants
other traditional modes of communication. To deny to the states
the power to draw this line is to write into the Constitution the
notion that every instance of peaceful picketing-anywhere and
under any circumstances-is necessarily a phase of the controversy
which provoked the picketing. Such a view of the Due Process
Clause would compel the states to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode to conscript neutrals having no relation
to either the dispute or the industry in which it arose.
97. in Opera-on-Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 357, 34 N.E. (2d) 349, 353 (941),
cert. dc.ied, 314 U. S. 6zS (i94i) (evidently because no question under the 14th Amendment had been raised or considered).
98. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 83 (iqpo).
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"In forbidding such conscription of neutrals in the circumstances of the case before us, Texas represents the prevailing, and
probably the unanimous, policy of the states. We hold that the
Constitution does not forbid Texas to draw the line which has
been drawn here. To hold otherwise would be to transmute vital
constitutional liberties into doctrinaire dogma." 99
Mr. Justice Black challenged the basis of this conception. He
stressed the fact that the attitude of contractors on employing unior
labor might be influenced by those with whom they did business ant
held that the union had the right to inform members of the public ofthe situation so that they might "use their influence to tip the stales in
favor of the side they think is right.". He rejected the suggestion of
the majority that the union be limited to an appeal to the public "at
greater expense" over the radio or in the press.
Mr. Jiustice Reed wrote a more extensive opinion which reviewed
the recent picketing cases heard by the Court. He considered the problem settled by the Thornhill and Suing 100 cases, from which he quoted
at length. He was unable to see how the picketing of the manufacturers and retailers in the Wold case was any different from the picketing of the owner in the present one. He feared that the decision might
authorize a state to bar from the picket line workers not a part of
the industry picketed, and considered such limitation on free speech
"unwarranted." He said:
"Until today orderly, regulated, -picketing has been within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such picketing was
obviously disadvantageous to the business affected. In balancing
social advantages it has been felt that the preservation of free
speech in labor disputes was more important than the freedom of
enterprise from the burdens of the picket line." 101
4. "Mutiny." Finally, there is the case of Southern Steamship
Co. v. Natio~wl Labor Relations Board,0 2 a five to four decision,
which denied the N. L. R. B. the right to reinstate.seamen who had
struck while on board ship in a safe domestic poit, even though the
sit-in strike was peaceful and had been occagioned by the refusal of the
employer to bargain with a union certified by the Board. This decision
rested primarily on the holding that the strike was a violation of the
statute against mutiny.1 0 3 Mr. Justice Byrnes, for the majority,
99. Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 8o7, 8to (1942).
1o. A. F. L. v. Suing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941).
ior. Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritters Cafe, 62 Sup. Ct. 807, 8x5 (1942).
io 62 Sup. Ct. 886 (i942).
103. 35 STAT. 1146 (1909) ; 18 U. S. C. A. 483, 484 (1909).
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pointed out that the strike was not at the home port of the vessel, that
the relationship between master and seamen was different from that of
the ordinary employer and employee, that the shipping articles expiressly
bound seamen to obedience. He referred to the Normandie fire as
indicative of the importance of obedience even in a safe port. And he
stressed the difference between seamen who, striking, remain aboard a
vessel and the ordinary sit-down strike, because of the necessity for
providing living quarters on the ship for those who might replace the
strikers. Therefore, in line with the policy expressed in the Fansteel
case,1 04 he concluded that the Board had no discretion in a situation
such as this. He said:
"It is difficult to imagine that they would have surrendered
their jobs and their quarters withott a struggle. They asserted
their right to occupy the quarters and to eat the food which the
master was required to furnish them as members of the crew and
yet to refuse to work or to obey his orders.

.

. . In fact, as we

have noted, they intended, according to the witness Tracey, to
'still be sitting there' if petitioner had not capitulated to their
demands.
"We cannot ignore the fact that the strike was unlawful from
its very inception."

05

For the minority, Justice Reed, without expressing an opinion on
the "mutiny" aspects of the case, stressed the difference between this
and the Fansteel case. He pointed out that the disobedience of the
crew did not in fact endanger the ship and that the discharges were
not for disobedience but for striking. He said:
"We think that under these circumstances, it [the labor board]
acted within its authority. We can see ho justification, for an iron
rule that a discharge of a striker by his employer for some particular unlawful conduct in furtherance of a strike is sufficient to bar
his reinstatement as a matter of law. Fansteel teaches that there
are extremes of conduct which leave no discretion to the Board.
We think that the acts here fall on the other side of the line and
that the Circuit Court of Appeals properly so determined." 106
Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy concurred.
CoNCLUSION

In retrospect, this Term appears to mark the first serious recession
from the great advances made during the past decade in the field of
104. 306 U. S. 2S8 (1939).

ios. Southcrn S. S. Co. v. N. L R. B., 62 Sup. Ct. 886, 895 (1942).
1o6. Id. at 897.
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civil liberties. For, while the trend was foreshadowed in several decisions of recent years such as those in the Gobitis case 107 of the 1939
Term and the Mcadowmoor case 10s of the 194o Term, these were, so
to speak, merely the backwash from substantial advances as represented
09 Veiss,110 Chambers,"' Schneider,"' Cantwell I
by the Nardo'e,1
and Tlornhil 114 cases, of the 1939 Term. While, at the z941 Term,
advances were scored in the Edwards,1 5 Bridges I" and Ski nnerr" T
cases, it is significant that the first two of these were carried over from
the year before and were decided in the first months of the new Term.
Thereafter, recessions occurred in cases dealing with the right to counsel, labor's rights and the taxation of leaflet distribution.
It is nonetheless encouraging that these recessions did not pass
unchallenged. A new dissenting trio has arisen, that of Justices Black,
Douglas and Murphy. Some day, perhaps it will fill the place of those
great trios of the past, first Holmes, Brandeis and Stone and, later,
Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, and see its views accepted by a majority
of the future. It is strange that the present Chief Justice has sided
with the new dissenters in only one case, Jones v. Opelika,"a and that
he should have differed with them when, in the Bridges case, they constituted the majority. Justice Reed twice joined this trio in dissent,
but parted company with them in the Jones case. Justice Jackson was
on their side in a divided court'in the Bridges case only, when he and
Justice Reed made a majority for the views of the Black trio. Thus,
it will be seen, no stability as yet exists in the composition of the
present Court. It is to be hoped, however, that, at least in civil liberties cases, the Chief Justice and Justices Reed and Jackson will more
frequently adhere to the views of the Black trio. A dear stand in support of basic liberties is Ynore essential now than ever before? I
io7. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (x94o).
lo8. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies Milk Inc., 312 U. S.
287 (1941).
log. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1940).
izo. Weiss v. United States, 3o8 U. S. 32 (194o).
Ill. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940).
112. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
113. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 26 (1940).
I14. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
11_. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. i6o (x94i).
116. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
1x7. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 62 Sup. Ct. z1o (i94a).
i8. 62 Sup. Ct. 1231 (1942).
hig. See Ca'axr, FRFmou or SPEwH (i942) 437.
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(The cases are listed, in each group, in order of decision; the numerals in parentheses
refer to the footnotes of the article.)
O--Majority opinion.
C-C,ncurring opinion.
D-Dissenting opinion.
X-'Xvt participating.
C-Concurring.
D-Dissenting.
*-A mcmorandun concurred in by these justices indicated adherence to the main
point of the dissenting opinion.
t--Opinion per curiam.

